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Abstract The traditional law of blockade has several technical requirements that
if not met renders a blockade unlawful. These traditional requirements balance the
interests of the belligerent and neutrals. A more contemporary view on the law of
blockade, however, emphasizes that blockades are also subject to the restrictions
and general obligations imposed by treaties and general principles of humanitarian
law. Crucially, whether or not the consequences of a breach of humanitarian
principles or humanitarian law render a naval blockade unlawful or not is however
not at all clear. The recent use of naval blockades during the Israeli military
operations has given rise again to the discussion as to what renders a blockade
unlawful. The maturation of the law of blockade has seen an increasing willingness
to embrace aspects of humanitarian law. However, the diversity of views from the
international community as endorsed by the published reports on the flotilla incident
demonstrates that there remains a lack of consensus and an active discussion on the
state of the law of blockade.
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1 Introduction
On 31 May 2010, Israeli military personnel boarded the so called Freedom flotilla, a
group of vessels bound for the Gaza, in international waters in order to prevent it
from sailing into Gaza. The Israeli intervention resulted in nine passengers death
with several more wounded. The Israeli government maintained that the maritime
interdiction was legitimate because: ‘A maritime blockade is in effect off the coast
of Gaza. Such blockade has been imposed, as Israel is currently in a state of armed
conflict with the Hamas regime that controls Gaza’.1 The disastrous consequences
of the boarding instantly made the Freedom Flotilla incident world news with
headlines such as: ‘Israeli attacks sets storm of criticism’, appearing on the front
page of the International Herald Tribune,2 conveying a sense of outrage. Before,
but also after the flotilla incident, other vessels bound for Gaza were intercepted and
diverted based on the existence of a naval blockade but attracted less media
attention.3 At the centre of the legal discussion within the media is the debate over
the applicability of relevant law, whether the Israeli blockade is legally justifiable
and the consequences that follow (Guilfoyle 2010; Vreeken 2010; Fink 2010;
Dershowitz 2010).4 Without answering these questions, the President of the Security
Council issued a statement a day after the incident in which he condemned the
Israeli actions, called for an investigation and reiterated the UN’s grave concerns on
the humanitarian situation in the Gaza, already addressed in UNSC-resolutions 1850
(2008) and 1860 (2009).5 Interestingly, the Council’s statement did not specifically
comment on the legality of the blockade itself, and it only requested (as opposed to
demanded) the immediate release of the persons detained by the Israeli during the
operation.6 Some states, such as Turkey,7 declared the blockade to be illegal.8
Others, such as the Netherlands, only called for a lifting of the blockade, but without
expressing an opinion on its legality.9
1 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/Legal?Issues?and?Rulings/Gaza_flotilla_maritime_
blockade_Gaza-Legal_background_31-May-2010.htm.
2 International Herald Tribune, 1 June 2010, p. 1 and 5.
3 In February 2009 the Togo flagged vessel Tali was diverted which caused some stir. See:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/world/middleeast/06mideast.html. In September 2010 the Irene
was diverted while sailing to the Gaza. See: http://idfspokesperson.com/2010/09/28/provocation-
yacht-on-its-way-to-ashdod-port-boarded-by-israel-navy-without-incident-28-sept-2010/.
4 International Herald Tribune, 1 June 2010: ‘Israeli attack sets off storm of Criticism’, Page 1.
5 S/PRST/2010/9, 1 June 2010.
6 The statement on the detained persons reads:
‘The Security Council requests the immediate release of the ships as well as the civilians held by Israel.
The Council urges Israel to permit full consular access, to allow the countries concerned to retrieve their
deceased and wounded immediately, and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance from the
convoy to its destination’.
7 The persons that we killed on the board the Mavi Marmara all had Turkish citizenship. See table
Hudson-Philips report, pp. 28–29.
8 See SC/9940, 31 May 2010.
9 Press release of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 31 May 2010, ‘Nederland wil opheldering
Israe¨l over geweld Gaza-schepen’, at: http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/Actueel/Nieuwsberichten/2010/05/
Nederland_wil_opheldering_Israe¨l_over_geweld_Gaza_schepen.
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The Israeli blockade of the Gaza-strip was originally established on 3 January
2009 as part of the ongoing operations against Hamas (Operation Cast Lead).10 The
blockade was not lifted when military operations ceased but remained in force. It is
not the first time that Israel has used a naval blockade in its recent military
operations. During the second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, Israel also
established a blockade off the coast of Lebanon during Operation Change of
Direction. Israel justified the action based upon the right of self-defense, after two
Israeli soldiers were captured by Hezbollah (Schmitt 2008). The blockade off the
coast of Lebanon started in July 2006 and ended in October of the same year,
followed by an UN arms-embargo operation off the coast of Lebanon, enforced by a
Maritime Taskforce of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission, authorized by UNSCR
1701 (2006). Whilst both maritime operations were directed against the Hezbollah,
they relied upon separate and distinct legal justifications.11
The Israeli belligerent blockade operations once again brought into the spotlight
a rather obscure subject of international law: the law of blockade. As part of the law
of naval warfare, the law of blockade and its concepts remain outdated. Ronzitti, in
his prominent article ‘The Crisis of the traditional law regulating international
armed conflicts at sea and the need for its revision’ (Ronzitti 1988; see also on the
discussion of revision of the laws of naval warfare, Ashley Roach 2000, pp. 76–77)
has urged for a complete revision of the laws of naval warfare, including the laws of
blockade, which remains without contemporary codification.
Several reports have already been published on the Israeli conduct of blockades
and there are others underway. Three were adopted by the Human Rights Council of
the United Nations: The report on the second Lebanon War of 2006,12 the report on
the Israeli operation Cast Lead (the Goldstone report13) and the report concerning
the Freedom Flotilla incident in 2010 (the Hudson-Philips report14). Two other
reports are pending investigations of the flotilla incident. One of the investigations
was commissioned by Israel a few weeks after the incident and presided over by
Judge Jacob Turkel (Turkel Commission) with international observers (William
David Trimble and Ken Watkin).15 The second consisted of a panel appointed by
10 http://www.mag.idf.il/592-4071-en/patzar.aspx.
11 See on the UNIFIL maritime taskforce (Weinga¨rtner 2007; Fink 2008).
12 A/HRC/3/2, 26 November 2006. Report of the commission of inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human
Rights Council resolution 2/1, 23 November http://www.island.lk/2009/02/07/world5.html 2006 (A/HRC/
15/21). Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNHRC,,LBN,4562d8cf2,45c30b6e0,0.
html.
13 A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009. Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict.
Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/factfindingmission.htm.
14 A/HRC/15/21, Report of the international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of interna-
tional law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks




of this commission as at: http://www.turkel-committee.com/index-eng.html. Israel first rejected an
international commission to inquire on the raid and later decided to have an Israeli commission with
international observers (Kershner 2010).
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the UN-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and led by Geoffrey Palmer.16 While the
penal led by Palmer has yet to report its findings,17 a first part of the report by the
Turkel Commission has already been released on 23 January 2011,18 and discusses,
amongst others, the question: ‘Whether the actions carried out by Israel to enforce
the naval blockade on May 31, 2010, complied with the rules of international law’.19
The Hudson-Philips and the Lebanon report consider the method of blockade as part
of the overall Israeli military operations. All three reports therefore offer an
interesting perspective on the contemporary view of the application of the law of
naval blockade. What makes it even more interesting is that the Hudson-Philips
Mission and the Turkel Commission reach different conclusions on the naval
blockade. The latter concludes that the blockade is in compliance with international
law, whereas the Hudson-Philips report argues that the blockade was unlawfully
established. The Goldstone report, whilst it analyses the closure of Gaza as a whole,
does not contain any specific analysis of the naval blockade or upon the law of
blockades.20
1.1 Structure
This article focuses on the contemporary development of the law of blockade seen
against the backdrop of the recent practice of the Israeli military operations. The
aim is to raise awareness of the state of the law of blockade and to argue for the
adoption of a more modern approach in which the traditional balance between
interests of neutrals and belligerent is considered in the context of international
humanitarian law and principles. I will first make a few remarks on the legal
requirements and principles of the traditional and modern law of blockade. Second,
I will consider what renders a blockade unlawful when it does not meet the
requirements under either the traditional or modern law of blockade. I do not
propose to consider the question of the legality of the Israeli military actions on
board the Mavi Marmara in this article or the question whether the laws of naval
warfare or international humanitarian law as a whole are applicable to the situation
in the Gaza (Guilfoyle 2011; Darcy and Reynolds 2010), which is beyond the scope
of this article.
2 The traditional law of blockade: technical requirements
The legal debate that emerged from the freedom flotilla incident did not so much
revolve around any treaty on the law of blockade, but around customary law,
16 http://www.un.org/apps//news/story.asp?NewsID=35584&Cr=FLOTILLA&Cr1=.
17 At 25 February 2010.
18 The report can be found at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/LegalAdvocacy/Delegitimization/GazaFlotilla/
Turkel-Commission-publishes-first-part-of-report-23-Jan-2011.htm.
19 See covering letter of the report.
20 See on commentary on this report for instance (Blank 2009).
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national military commander’s handbooks,21 and the San Remo Manual on
international law applicable to armed conflicts at sea (Doswald-Beck 1995a) in
particular. This is because, other than the Declaration of Paris (1856)22 concluded
after the end of the Crimean War (1853–1856), no treaty exists that regulates the
law of blockade. Its legal boundaries are mainly developed via state practice and
domestic prize courts (Garner 1927a; Verzijl 1917). The Declaration of London of
1909 was intended to fill this gap in international law in the wake of setting up an
international prize court. As the British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey wrote to
the nations invited to the London Conference, organized as a follow up to the
second Hague Convention of 1907, ‘The impression that was gained that the
establishment of the International Prize Court would not meet with general
acceptance so long as vagueness and uncertainty exists as to the principles which the
Court (…) would apply to questions of far-reaching importance affecting naval
policy and practice’.23 An International Prize Court would have needed a set of
rules, including rules on blockade, which were internationally acceptable. The
London Declaration suffered a similar fate to the Hague Convention XII on the
International Prize Court; it was never ratified and lost its momentum in the years
leading up to the First World War. The efforts devoted to the London Declaration on
the law of blockade were not really wasted as most of the 21 articles in the
Declaration that deal with blockade are considered as international customary law
and are considered as having the status of legal guidelines when states apply the law
of blockade (Green 2000).
2.1 Notification, effectiveness and impartiality
There are as many definitions of a blockade as there are legal handbooks that
describe the subject. One can be found in the San Remo Manual (SRM): ‘Blockade
is the blocking of the approach to the enemy coast, or part of it, for the purpose of
preventing the ingress and egress of vessels [or aircraft] of all states’.24 The
traditional law of blockade requires three main elements to be satisfied for a
blockade to be lawfully established. They are technical in nature and deal with the
establishment of a blockade and with the manner in which a blockade must be
conducted. The first requirement for establishing a blockade is that it must formally
21 Much used as reference is the United States’ Commander’s Handbook on the law of naval operations
that is seen as an authoritative handbook on maritime operational law (Thomas and Duncan 1999).
22 The fourth declaration of the Paris Declaration reads as follows:
Les blocus, pour eˆtre obligatoires, doivent eˆtre effectifs, c’est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante
pour interdire re´ellement l’acce`s du littoral de l’ennemi.
23 Letter from ‘Sir Edward Grey to his Majesty’s Representatives at Berlin, Madrid, Paris, Rome, St.
Petersburgh, Tokio, Vienna and Washington’, in Correspondence and documents respecting the
international naval conference, held in London December 1908–February 1909 (1909).
24 San Remo manual, p. 176. The Turkel-commission for instance chose to use the definition of the US
Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the law of naval operations (Thomas and Duncan 1999): ‘Blockade is
a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as neutral, from
entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the
control of an enemy nation’.
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be declared by the belligerent establishing it through several notifications.25 The
purpose of the notifications is to inform all whom it may concern of its existence,
details and its implications, in particular for neutral states and vessels. A diplomatic
notification informs the neutral states and acts as a declaration, as Bentwich states:
‘which is the act of the competent authority (the belligerent Government or its naval
commander) stating that a blockade is or is about to be established’ (Bentwich
1911). The London Declaration further requires that the commander of the
blockading force must notify the local authorities concerned.26 Whether a captured
vessel is supposed to know that its destination was barred by a blockade is a
question for a prize court. However, with the existence of mass communication
available also in the maritime dimension one would argue that it is hard to miss
something as important as a blockaded coast or port. Indeed a notice to mariners
intended to reach interested maritime parties is frequently used to distribute
information on any kind of maritime zones, such as a blockade. Apart from
informing neutral states through diplomatic channels, notification by means of a
notice to mariners seems to be an accepted practice.27 Apart from these notifications
some authors argue that commanders at sea should also warn every individual vessel
that tries to run the blockade (van Bylandt 1880). This is not an obligation under the
traditional law of blockade, but one could consider individual warnings in a
graduated response towards enforcing measures.
The second requirement is that the blockade must be enforced in a manner which
is both effective and impartial (Tucker 1955; Fraunces also adds the respect for
neutral rights to the main principles, Fraunces 1992, p. 895). How one measures
effectiveness has always been the subject of continuing debate that has evolved as
military technology develops.28 Legally, there is no more guidance offered than the
general phrase: ‘whether it is effective is a question of fact’,29 which stems from the
25 See articles 8, 9, 11, 16 LD.
26 Art. 11 sub 2 LD. Garner mentions a case during the Italian blockade in the Adriatic Sea against
Albania during the First World War in which Italy notified the Greek Legation in Rome of the blockade
but did not notify the local authorities. Despite that omission the Italian Prize Court put no consequence to
it (Garner 1927, p 626). See also Verzijl (1917), pp. 189–190.
27 See para’s 58–60 of the Turkel report for an analysis of the notification that was published by Israel on
the Gaza blockade. The main concern of the commission is that it has no exact duration period as is a
requirement under paragraph 94 SRM, but mentions that the blockade will be established ‘‘until further
notice’’. It is however not a requirement under the London Declaration. The passage according to the
Commission does not affect the legality of the notification. The notice to mariners reads as follows:
NO. 1/2009 Blockade of Gaza Strip, Tuesday, 06 January 2009 00:00
1. Subject: Blockade of Gaza Strip
2. Source : Israeli Navy
All mariners are advised that as of 03 January 2009, 1700 UTC, Gaza maritime area is closed to all
maritime traffic and is under blockade imposed by Israeli Navy until further notice. Maritime Gaza area is
enclosed by the following coordinates:
31 35.71N, 34 29.46E; 31 46.80N, 34 10.01E; 31 19.39N, 34 13.11E; 31 33.73N, 33 56.68E
See for a map of the blockaded zone: C. Migdalovitz, Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara
Incident, and Its Aftermath (Congressional Research Service, 23 June 2010), p. 16. Available at:
http://www.crs.gov.
28 See for instance (Barnett 2005).
29 Art. 3 LD, 95 SRM.
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1856 Paris Declaration.30 The rule bans the so called paper-blockades that are
declared but not enforced by military means. In operational terms, enforcing an
effective blockade means assigning a sufficient force of often scarce assets to
prevent the ingress and egress of a port or coast for a certain period of time. States
may therefore have difficulty in establishing an effective blockade because they do
not have enough naval assets available. Having said that, because of military
operations are nowadays mostly conducted in a multinational role, a coalition could
more realistically provide such an effective force.
The principle of impartiality requires that the blockade must be enforced against
every vessel of every nation. Contrary to the law of contraband that allows only the
capture of contraband goods, a blockade is all encompassing and does not allow any
vessel to pass through it. In the classic case Franciska (1854), the English Privy Council
also added that even merchant vessels belonging to the blockading party were not
allowed to pass a blockade.31 Although some nations may be more affected than others
by a blockade, impartiality, as Schmitt mentions, ‘also protects neutral nations in the
sense that selective enforcement of a blockade towards neutrals can be seen as a form of
economic warfare against both the opponent and the victimized neutral’ (Schmitt 1992,
p. 38). Exceptions in the London Declaration to impartiality are made for vessels in
distress and neutral warships.32 These exceptions are however expressed in terms of the
belligerent party allowing certain activities, not as a positive right for the neutral.
Tucker mentions that impartiality is not violated if the commander of a blockading
force allows a neutral warship to pass the blockade and to depart from a blockaded port,
however under the belligerents’ conditions.33 Obviously the decision to allow or deny
the passage of neutral warships through a blockade for instance to evacuate its subjects
will be a sensitive political decision. As discussed below, the modern aspects of the law
of blockade has added more exceptions to the principle of impartiality, but as a matter of
obligation for the belligerent instead of a right. Although the SRM has not taken over
the provisions concerning vessels in distress at sea, one could argue that the blockading
party will also need to take into account the international law of the sea, in which there is
a general obligation to render assistance to vessels in need.34
30 See note 22 above.
31 The Danish flagged merchant vessel Franciska was captured on 22 May 1854 in the Gulf of Riga
which was at the time blockaded by Great Britain as part of military operations against Russia during the
Crimean War. The Council stated in this case that: No blockade can be legitimate that admits to either
belligerent a freedom of commerce denied to the subjects not engaged in the war (Moore 1855–1857,
p. 48). See on the blockade operation (Lambert 2006).
32 Artt. 6 and 7 LD; 100 SRM.
33 Tucker (1955), 291. See also the explanations (p. 178) of the San Remo Manual on this point in
paragraph 100: ‘Although neutral warships and military aircraft enjoy no positive right of access to
blockaded areas, the belligerent imposing the blockade may authorize their entry and exit’.
34 See article 98 UNCLOS III. See on the relationship between the international law of the sea and the
laws of naval warfare chapter 17 (Military uses of the sea) of R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The law of
the sea (1999). Tucker mentions that whether merchant vessels in evident distress may demand a
permission to enter a blockaded port is unsettled. Tucker (1955), 291. Now more than 50 years later and
against the background of a thorough development of the international law of the sea, it may still not be
that the vessel in distress can demand permission but the obligation to render assistance is now a well
established principle.
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3 The modern law of blockade: balancing humanitarian principles
In essence the traditional law of blockade seeks to achieve a balance between
belligerent and neutral rights. The rule that a blockade may not bar access to neutral
ports and coasts is a classic and specific example of this balance in force,35 as is the
principle of impartiality and the duty to notify. Due to the use of exclusion zones
during the Iraq–Iran war in the Persian Gulf (Boczek 1989, pp. 250–253) and the
Falklands War and the use of maritime forces to enforce UN-embargoes from the
1990s onwards, the legal aspects of exclusion zones (Michaelsen 2003; Goldie
1991; Politakis 1998) and maritime embargo operations (Wynkoop 1995; Politakis
1994; Rosensweig 1995) have received much attention, often choosing the law of
blockade as the legal point of departure for unchartered areas of law (Fielding
1993). The development of the law of belligerent blockade itself, however, fell
away to the background, not in the least because there has hardly been any practical
situation in which the law of blockade has been exercised. In the judgment of the
ICTY against Pavle Strugar who conducted the military operations against the
Dubrovnik region during the battle for Croatian independence in 1991, the Court
does mention the use of a blockade by the Yugoslav People’s Army against
Dubrovnik.36 Whilst the development of humanitarian principles has gained much
ground within the law of military operations, the law of blockade, specifically with
regard to the relationship between the law of blockade, has not thoroughly
matured.37
The traditional law of blockade does not contain any provisions that consider the
wellbeing of civilians of a nation who are besieged from the sea. The development
of humanitarian principles and law has, however, not left the law of blockade
untouched. The law of blockade is subject to the restrictions imposed by the treaties
and general principles of humanitarian law. Whereas the legality of the blockades
during, for instance, the Korean War (1950) or the Indo-Pakistani conflict (1971)
were discussed along traditional law requirements,38 only more recently during the
embargo operations against Iraq in 1990 imposed by UNSCR 665 (1990) the
importance of humanitarian principles and obligations became more of a focus in
these kinds of naval operations. Although it must be emphasized that embargo
operations are not the same as classical belligerent blockades in the strict legal
35 See art. 18 LD; 99 SRM.
36 See Prosecutor versus Pavle Strugar, trial judgment, IT-01-42-T, 31 January 2005, para’s 31–39.
Whether or not this blockade was established in accordance with the requirements of the law of blockade
is unknown.
37 A more recent blockading activity that is often called ‘‘a naval blockade’’ has been the blockade that
was established in 2007 by the African Union around one of the Comoros Islands (Anjouan) in support of
the Union of Comoros Government, which preceded operation Open democracy in the Comoros. Of this
Comorian conflict, that went unnoticed to most of the world, little information of the blockade operations
seems available. Given the fact that the African Union supported in an internal matter, presumably, it may
have been a blockade only in fact and name, but not in the sense of a belligerent blockade. See on this
conflict Massey and Baker (2009).
38 See elaborately on these blockades G.P. Politakis (1998), pp. 62–69; Fielding (1993), pp. 1207–1211;
(Baer 1993) (on Korea), pp. 320–324.
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sense,39 still we see here the emergence of the debate on the concept of economical
closure of a State and the impact it has on the civilian population and the obligations
under humanitarian law.40 The development of classical belligerent blockades in
relation to humanitarian law was neglected until the establishment of the SRM
which took up the task of modernizing the law of naval warfare and merged some
aspects of humanitarian law with blockade law.
Today, the traditional balance between the belligerent and the neutral has
changed into a more complex balance between the belligerent, the neutral,
humanitarian principles and other areas of law that are intertwined with the use of a
naval blockade. This renewed balance of interacting laws and principles is the basis
upon which the modern approach to the law of blockade must now be seen.
Although it is well understood that the belligerent imposing a blockade as a method
of warfare also has obligations under the principles of international humanitarian
law and other relevant international law which cannot be lawfully ignored, the
manner in which these different aspects of the modern law of blockade should
interact is not completely clear. Many questions on the application of the modern
law of blockade and its consequences remain therefore unresolved. The modern
approach to the law of blockade has until recently not enjoyed any practice or any
case law to crystallize it, nor did this approach reach a level of formal codification.
Attempts to merge humanitarian principles with traditional blockade law have
obviously led to debate. Some provisions of the laws of war that impose extra
obligations for a belligerent during a blockade are easily incorporated in the
enforcement of a blockade, such as obligations of letting relief actions pass.41
Others are more difficult and have resulted in calls from commentators to render
parts of the law of blockade obsolete. By way of example, the all encompassing
effect of a blockade to a nation’s economy and its civilians is for instance difficult to
reconcile with the humanitarian principle of distinction. This has led to the
argument advocated by some academics that article 54 of the First Additional
39 Although art. 42 of the UN-Charter has the possibility to impose a blockade as measure, UNSCR 665
mentions that:
1. calls upon those Member-States co-operating with the Government of Iraq which are deploying
maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as
may be necessary under the specific authority of the Security Council to hold all inward and
outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to
ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661
(1990);
Apart from the discussion whether or not the laws of naval warfare should be applicable to this
interdiction operation, in this case maritime shipping could actually pass the embargo if they comply to
with the albeit strict provisions of UNSCR 661. As such it may resemble but is not a blockade in the
traditional sense that encompasses that no shipping at all may pass the blockade. See discussion on the
‘‘blockade’’ against Iraq (Robertson 1991, pp. 10–13). Robertson mentions among other things that:
unlike in blockade ships that attempted to deliver the prohibited items were turned back instead of being
captured (p. 11).
40 Jones briefly mentions in 1983 as a last observation the obligations under the Geneva laws (Jones
1983). In 1992 Fraunces still does not mention any of the humanitarian aspects while proposing new
guiding principles in the law of blockade. Fraunces (1992), pp. 893–918.
41 Art. 70 API.
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Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (API) concerning the prohibition to starve the
civilian population prohibits blockades as a lawful method of combat as a whole. In
1990 Van Hegelsom wrote that this argument is not generally accepted (van
Hegelsom 1992, p. 46). Proponents of this view42 see their argument supported by
article 49, paragraph 3 API that reads:
(3.) The provisions of this section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which
may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on
land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against
objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air.
For some States, merging the law of blockade with the provisions of API could
be one step too far particularly if they are not a party to additional protocols, as is
the case of the United States and Israel. The US-commander’s handbook on naval
operations for instance only goes so far as to mention the traditional requirements
and does not consider the modern humanitarian aspects as obligations under the law
of blockade (Thomas and Duncan 1999, pp. 390–395). In this situation the legal
obligation of non-signatories of the Protocol under these rules may depend on
whether or not the specific provision is already viewed as customary international
law.
3.1 The San Remo Manual
The SRM is the result of a ‘‘seven year project on the ‘modernization’ of the law of
armed conflict at sea’’, as the editor Doswald-Beck of the Manual has described it
(Doswald-Beck 1995b, p. 192). It is widely considered as the most modern and
authoritative publication concerning the laws of naval warfare. The SRM sought to
modernize the laws of naval warfare, keeping in mind that developing technology,
humanitarian law and international law of the sea all have had its impact on the
applicability of the laws of naval warfare in contemporary naval operations. The
SRM has a specific section that deals with the rules on blockades. They can be
divided in paragraphs which basically restate the customary international law on
blockades (par. 98–101 SRM) on the one hand and paragraphs that are an effort to
update the laws of naval warfare with humanitarian principles (par. 102–104) on the
other. These latter sections read as follows:
102. The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if:
(a) it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it
other objects essential for its survival; or
(b) the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be,
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated
from the blockade.
103. If the civilian population of the blockaded territory is inadequately
provided with food and other objects essential for its survival, the blockading
42 Like Dinstein (see Dinstein 2004).
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party must provide for free passage of such foodstuffs and other essential
supplies, subject to:
(a) the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under
which such passage is permitted; and
(b) the condition that the distribution of such supplies shall be made under the
local supervision of a Protecting Power or a humanitarian organization which
offers guarantees of impartiality, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross.
104. The blockading belligerent shall allow the passage of medical supplies
for the civilian population or for the wounded and sick members of armed
forces, subject to the right to prescribe technical arrangements, including
search, under which such passage is permitted.
These sections are an attempt to merge articles 54 sub 1,43 7044 API and the
principle of proportionality with the law of blockade. According to the international
customary law study of the ICRC, the content of both articles of the Geneva
Conventions can also be seen as customary law.45 Thus the provisions are
applicable whether or not a state is a party to API. The second section on blockades
referred to in the SRM is often quoted as constituting essential guidelines or
sometimes even quoted as law. Not surprisingly, it is also the centre-piece of the
legal discussion in the freedom flotilla incident and used as a basis for the different
investigators. The Hudson-Philips report mentions that: ‘While not authoritative, its
43 Art. 54 sub 1 API (protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population) reads
as follows:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
44 Art 70 API (relief actions) reads as follows:
1. If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than
occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies mentioned in Article 69, relief actions
which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be
undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions. Offers of such relief
shall not be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the distribution of relief
consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity
cases and nursing mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to be accorded
privileged treatment or special protection.
2. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate rapid and
unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance with this
Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian population of the adverse Party.
3. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party which allow the passage of relief
consignments, equipment and personnel in accordance with paragraph 2:
(a) shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such
passage is permitted;
(b) may make such permission conditional on the distribution of this assistance being made under the
local supervision of a Protecting Power;
(c) shall, in no way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are
intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian
population concerned.
4. The Parties to the conflict shall protect relief consignments and facilitate their rapid distribution.
5. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party concerned shall encourage and facilitate
effective international co-ordination of the relief actions referred to in paragraph 1.
45 See rule 53 of the ICRC-customary study.
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codification effort has had a significant impact on the formulation of military
manuals and it has been expressly relied upon by Israel’.46 The Turkel-commission
comments upon the SRM: ‘This manual will serve as the primary basis for the legal
analysis of the issues before the Commission. However, since some of the provisions
in the SRM are regarded as reflecting a progressive development of the law rather
than merely a restatement thereof, the analysis below is also based on other accepted
texts and manuals in order to identify areas where there may not be complete
international consensus on the San Remo rules’.47 The Turkel-commission also
touches upon an opposing view concerning the legal applicability of these rules. It
comments that the rules in general may be seen as customary law; the document itself
does not bind states as a treaty would. Even if both the humanitarian law and
blockade law independently can be considered as customary law, the merged
customary status of paragraphs 102–104 SRM is still open to debate. There may be
opinio iuris, but without actual practice the question as to whether these sections
should be granted the status of customary international law is still a question that
remains subject to debate.48 Up until the recent Israeli blockades there has been no
opportunity to test these particular sections. The economic sanctions imposed by the
UN-Security Council against Iraq that prevented trade from entering Iraq in 1990
reignited the debate on blockade-type of naval operations and the responsibilities
under the Geneva Conventions, but the effect of the sanctions legally did not
constitute a belligerent blockade (Provost 1992; Sklaire 1990–1991; Geiss 2005).
4 The Israeli blockades
The importance of the debate on the contemporary scope of the international law of
blockade is again underlined by the recent use of blockade operations by Israel. The
reactions to the enforcement of the Gaza blockade by Israel suggest that the law of
blockade with its far reaching implications49 seems to have been forgotten and does
not sit comfortably with the contemporary view of legal use of the sea.50 Maritime
principles, such as freedom of navigation and sovereignty of the flag state over a
46 Hudson-Philips report, para. 50.
47 Turkel report, para. 33.
48 See also the discussion in general about state practice and the San Remo Manual in Dalton (2006).
49 Vessels that breach a blockade run the risk of being captured and confiscated. Its cargo may be
condemned and its crew can be detained for the period the prize court will need to adjudicate the prize
(Colombos 1962). See also article 20 and 21 LD; Tucker (1955), 295. Paragraph 98 SRM mentions that:
‘Merchant vessels believed on reasonable grounds to be breaching a blockade may be captured. Merchant
vessels which, after prior warning, clearly resist capture may be attacked’. See also paragraph 146f and 67
SRM. The Hudson-Philips report—after having concluded that the blockade was illegal—argues that:
‘there was no legal basis for the Israeli authorities to have detained and transported these people to Israel.
The passengers found themselves in Israel on the basis of an unlawful act by the State of Israel’. See
para’s. 183–233, in particular para. 215.
50 What falls outside of the scope of the topics discussed in this article is the question how to enforce a
blockade relates to the freedom of the high seas. Immediately after the flotilla incident the argument was
often used that the unlawfulness of the action flows from the fact that the convoy was sailing in
international waters, which limits the legal possibilities to visit a vessel. See for instance:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/operation-sea-breeze-legal.htm.
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vessel, appear to have taken precedence over the principles that are derived from the
laws of naval warfare. Further, the Gaza blockade re-opened the discussion on what
the modern requirements are to legally enforce a naval blockade. The flotilla
incident is interesting in respect of the development of the law of blockade because
both the traditional and the modern legal views are being adopted by the parties. As
I will demonstrate in more detail below, the Hudson-Philips report sees the legality
of the law of blockade primarily from the perspective of the humanitarian law
aspects of enforcing a blockade and argues that breaches of humanitarian law can
render a blockade unlawful. Israel and the Turkel Commission on the other hand
take a more traditional approach and center their arguments on the traditional law.
4.1 Human Rights Council reports
Both the Lebanon report on the military operations against the Hezbollah and the
Hudson-Philips report on the flotilla incident do not explicitly consider the
traditional laws of blockade to be obsolete. In its analysis, the Hudson-Philips
Mission refers to the traditional criteria, but only briefly.51 No in-depth analysis is
made in respect of the principles of effectiveness, impartiality, notification or any
other more detailed rule of the law of blockade. It also does not state whether in its
view Israel has complied with these requirements or not. Greater attention is paid to
the humanitarian aspects as mentioned in the SRM and the obligations of a
belligerent under humanitarian law.52
The Lebanon report, whilst mentioning that the full scope of the law of armed
conflict applies,53 does not refer to the traditional requirements of the laws of
blockade. It does, however, discuss the impact of the blockade from a humanitarian,
economical and environmental perspective.54 In paragraph 184–18755 of the report
the Commission mentions the obligation to allow humanitarian relief to enter
Lebanon but only late in the conflict, due to the delayed required authorization from
the Israeli’s. The Commission furthermore concluded that: ‘Israel’s engagement in
an armed conflict does not exempt it from its general obligation to protect the
environment and to react to an environmental catastrophe such as that which took
place on the Lebanese coasts’.56 The report ultimately concludes in paragraph 275
that the blockade is disproportionate:
51 Hudson-Philips report, para. 51.
52 Hudson-Philips report, para. 51.
53 On page 79 the Lebanon report mentions that:
Israel attacked Hezbollah as well as Lebanese targets, with the Lebanese armed forces barely putting
up any resistance. This situation has been deemed a unique (sui generis) situation, whereby the
comparison with the hostile occupation without resistance forces itself upon us. That approach leads to
the full regime for international armed conflicts being applicable. This regime primarily consists of the
Geneva Conventions, the First Additional Protocol applying to Israel insofar as the stipulations are of a
customary law character. See also on the applicability of the law of armed conflict (Ducheine and Pouw
2009).
54 Lebanon report, para’s 271–274.
55 See also para. 272 of the Lebanon report.
56 Lebanon report, para. 273.
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The Commission believes that the impact of the blockade on human life, on
the environment and on the Lebanese economy seems to outweigh any
military advantage Israel wished to obtain through this action. The Commis-
sion finds that the blockade should have been adapted to the situation on the
ground, instead of being carried out in a comprehensive and inflexible manner
that resulted in great suffering to the civilian population, damage to the
environment, and substantial economic loss.
Interestingly, rather than concluding that as a result the blockade must be
considered illegal or a prohibited method of combat, the Lebanon report states that
the blockade should have been adapted so as to minimize the negative results.
Clearly, from the perspective of the Human Rights Council rapporteurs, both
reports view whether or not Israel adhered to the traditional laws in both blockade
operations not to have a huge part in the legal debate. The view of the commissions
is, however, not surprising given the steady development of the law of military
operations in which humanitarian principles play an increasingly prominent role.
4.2 Israel’s view on the Gaza blockade
The view from the UN-rapporteurs, not totally surprisingly, differs from that of the
blockading belligerent itself. Israel’s official legal statement bases the lawfulness of
the Gaza blockade primarily on the traditional law perspective.57 It underlines the
requirement of notification, impartiality and also repeats that it may not bar the
access of neutral ports and coasts. Israel points out that it has fulfilled the
requirements of the traditional law of blockade and understands that the
consequences of breaching a blockade are that: ‘Any vessel that violates or
attempts to violate a maritime blockade may be captured or even attacked under
international law’.58
This statement does not mention the humanitarian obligations that arise from
humanitarian law being part of the legal considerations of the lawfulness of a
blockade. In another publication of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
concerning the legal aspects of the naval blockade, mention is made of the SRM
as a justification for the legal conditions of the blockade. Apart from the traditional
requirements mention is made of an obligation to allow the passage of humanitarian
assistance, as mentioned in section 103 SRM.59 Israel does not ignore the
humanitarian aspects, but it does not consider it something that can affect the
lawfulness of the blockade. It furthermore stops short of considering any other
obligation under general humanitarian law. It appears therefore that Israel’s view as
to whether or not a blockade is lawfully established is seen separate from the
obligations it perceives it has under humanitarian law.
Whereas the Hudson-Philips report is of the view that legal obligations outside
the law of blockade can have an effect on the legality of establishing a blockade, the
57 See legal statement on the Gaza blockade: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/Legal?
Issues?and?Rulings/Gaza_flotilla_maritime_blockade_Gaza-Legal_background_31-May-2010.htm.
58 Para. 8 of the statement.
59 http://www.mag.idf.il/592-4071-en/patzar.aspx.
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Turkel Commission, as I will outline below, takes to the Israeli approach, staying
close to the traditional law and its few already accepted intertwinements of
humanitarian law. This is an important difference, also with regard to the legal
consequences for an established blockade, which I will elaborate on in the next
paragraphs.
5 What renders a blockade unlawful?
Legal literature on traditional blockade law is abundant on the requirements of how
to establish a blockade and what the consequences for a vessel are when it is in
violation.60 It also emphasizes that when the requirements for establishing a
blockade are not met, it is considered to be non-binding upon neutral Sates. In this
situation, a belligerent state cannot make any use of the authorities based on the law
of blockade. What exactly would render a blockade unlawful is, however, a more
complex issue, especially when seen from the perspective of the modern law of
blockade. In the following paragraphs I will consider three possible ways in which a
blockade could be determined to be unlawful: Unlawfulness under traditional law,
via a breach of humanitarian law and via a breach of the principles of the laws of war.
5.1 Traditional law
At first sight the traditional law seems quite clear on when a blockade is considered
to be unlawful. If one of the requirements of notification or effectiveness is not met,
a blockade can be considered non-binding upon neutral states.61 The technical
requirement of notification is rather straight forward and easy to determine. But the
debate obviously lies in the vagueness of the term ‘effective’. As Heinegg mentions,
‘there are no criteria that would make possible an abstract determination of the
effectiveness of all blockades’ (Heintschel von Heinegg 2006). Considering a
blockade non-binding based on this requirement seems therefore difficult to
establish and without an international court decision it would be hard to impose such
a position on the blockading belligerent. Smith recalls a historical case in 1861
when the whole coast of the Confederate States of some 3,000 miles was blockaded
by 45 ships and around 50 armed merchantmen of the United States. Although it
was clear that the blockade was not effective, no neutral power contested it and the
United States Supreme Court judged the blockade to be effective (Smith 1950).
According to Verzijl there were ten ‘‘regular’’ blockades62 established during the
First World War against which no claims of ineffectiveness were ever raised.63
Although the London Declaration does not explicitly attach consequence to the
non-fulfillment of the principle of impartiality,64 different authors referring to national
60 See for instance Tucker (1955), pp. 292–295.
61 Artt. 2 and 8 LD.
62 As opposed to the war zones or Sperrgebied that were used by the belligerents, which Verzijl calls
irregular blockades and departed from the classical way of imposing a blockade. Verzijl (1917), 197–223.
63 Verzijl (1917), 186–189.
64 Art. 5 LD.
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prize courts65 and military manuals regard impartiality as a condition.66 Section 100
SRM67 reiterates the rule of article 5 of the London Declaration on impartially, but it
fails to mention whether or not it renders a blockade unlawful. A neutral state against
who the principle is not adhered to will have the ability to complain to the belligerent.
Such a complaint, however, gives rise to another issue, as a claim of a State that is of the
opinion that the blockade is unlawfully established will not render the blockade
automatically unlawful for the complaining State or any other neutral state. The mere
claim may be legally correct and politically and internationally widely supported, but
does not overrule a decision of another State. What is required is the determination of
the issue by an independent body whose decision is binding upon all of the parties. This
is further enshrined in the principle of impartiality.
Verzijl opines also that a breach of article 1 of the London Declaration68 will
render a blockade unlawful because it lies in the very nature of the term ‘blockade’
that it is established against an enemy.69 Blockades established against States that
cannot be considered as such must be considered as unlawful. He furthermore
argues that the difference with article 18 of the London Declaration, which states
that blockading forces must not bar the access to neutral ports or coasts, is that the
blockade in the latter situation is not purposely directed against the neutral state but
by its enforcement factually also closes a neutral port or coast. Although it is a
breach of a provision of the law of blockade, it does not render the blockade itself
null and void as a whole.
5.2 Unlawfulness of a blockade via a breach of humanitarian law
Using a blockade as a method of warfare runs the risk of breaching humanitarian
law. The naval blockade can be the sole cause or aggravate the circumstances of the
breach. It could, for instance, result in there being a shortage of food, medical and
other essential supplies, that, if the conditions mentioned in for instance 23 GC IV,
59 GC IV or 70 API70 are not met and/or no sufficient relief to the civilian
population is given, may render the blockading party in breach of these articles.
Seen from a modern law of blockade perspective that includes humanitarian law as
65 See for instance the Franciska case, note 31 above.
66 For instance the US commander’s handbook (Thomas and Duncan 1999), para. 7.7.2.4. This paragraph
reads:
A blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels and aircraft of all nations. Discrimination by the
blockading belligerent in favor of or against the vessels and aircraft of particular nations, including those
of its own or those of an allied nation, renders the blockade legally invalid.
67 Section 100 SRM reads:
A blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels of all States.
68 Art. 1 LD reads:
A blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy.
69 Verzijl (1917), pp 190–191.
70 The main difference between articles 23 and 59 GC IV is the fact that article 59 is an obligation for an
occupying power whereas article 23 is not. The limit of article 23 however is, is that there are several
conditions with regard to the foodstuff and other essentials in which not the whole civilian population in
general falls under this provision. Art 70 API does mention civilian population in general but limit this
right as it is under the conditions of the blockading party.
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a factor when considering the unlawfulness of a blockade, the question arises as to
whether or not a breach of humanitarian law will also render the blockade unlawful.
There are no provisions within Geneva law that explicitly render a blockade
unlawful if it is breached. But, as said above, legal literature usually does make a
link between article 54 API that forbids starvation as a method of warfare and
blockades (Heintschel von Heinegg 1992). In this respect the ICRC-commentary on
article 54 API seems to differentiate between the intention and the result of the
blockade. If starvation is the purpose of establishing the blockade, it breaches article
54 API. When a blockade has starvation as a result it triggers relief actions or could
even lead to the evacuation of such persons, under article 17 GC IV (Sandoz et al.
1987). The ICRC-commentary does not, however, conclude that in this situation the
blockade becomes unlawfully established, but it merely mentions the uncertain
present state of the laws of naval warfare.
The same view with regard to the link between starvation and blockade is
adopted by the SRM. The SRM also explicitly notes the consequences for an
established blockade. Paragraph 102 SRM states that the establishment of a
blockade for the sole purpose of starving the civilian population is prohibited. In
line with the ICRC commentary this paragraph deals with the intention of the
blockade and not with its consequences, or as the SRM-explanation says, its side-
effects71: ‘Whenever the blockade has starvation as one of its effect, the starvation
effectively triggers the obligation, subject to certain limitations, to allow relief
shipping to gain access to the coasts of the blockaded belligerent’.72 This view is
reflected in paragraph 103 and 104 SRM that is concerned with the results of the
blockade and creates a duty to relieve the population of a blockaded area. A more
practical argument as to why this situation would not render the blockade unlawful
is that the choice of measures that are open to a belligerent to resolve the situation
aside from lifting the blockade are numerous. If a belligerent can take measures that
would address the violation while still enforcing the blockade, one can argue that it
remains lawfully established. If it is for instance possible to allow the ingress of
essential foodstuff by air and land to sufficiently address the deteriorating
humanitarian situation, or alter the enforcement of the blockade with regards to
allowing certain goods in, there is no ground to consider the naval blockade
unlawful.73 The SRM’s view towards potential unlawfulness of a blockade when its
purpose is starvation is supplemented by the ICRC study on customary international
humanitarian law (2005) which considers that the principle has the status of
customary law (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005). It points out that siege
warfare is forbidden if the purpose is to starve a civilian population, but not
prohibited if the purpose is to achieve a military objective. It also specifically
emphasizes that this principle also applies in the use of naval blockades and
embargoes. In summary, breaches of particular provisions of humanitarian law with
71 Para. 102(2) SRM.
72 San Remo Manual, p. 179.
73 Also Israel decided after the incident to liberalize the system by which civilian goods enter Gaza and
expand the inflow of materials for civilian projects under international supervision. See:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2010/Security_Cabinet_decision_17-Jun-
2010.htm.
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regard to the civilian population caused by a blockade create an obligation for the
belligerent to take action to remedy the situation, but do not necessarily render the
blockade unlawful, unless its purpose is to starve the blockaded population. As such,
it appears that in principle it is accepted that a breach of humanitarian law can have
an effect on the lawfulness of a blockade. In this respect it is interesting to mention
the conclusions of the Hudson-Philips report and the Turkel-Commission.
5.2.1 Collective punishment: the Hudson Philips-report
The Hudson-Philips report takes a step further with regard to the already accepted
norms for unlawfulness of a naval blockade. The Hudson-Philips Mission first of all
draws the conclusion that the humanitarian situation in the Gaza is such that the
laws of war are breached. The Mission classifies Israel’s closure of Gaza that
resulted in the grave humanitarian situation as collective punishment of the civilian
population, which is prohibited according to article 33 GC IV.74 This article states
that:
No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not
personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of
intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.
Pillage is prohibited.
Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.
Although Israel argues that the purpose of establishing the blockade lies in
reasons of security,75 paragraph 54 of the report rejects this argument and mentions
that: ‘The Mission considers that one of the principal motives behind the imposition
of the blockade was a desire to punish the people of the Gaza Strip for having
elected Hamas. The combination of this motive and the effect of the restrictions on
the Gaza Strip leave no doubt that Israel’s actions and policies amount to collective
punishment as defined by international law’.
A similar statement that article 33 GCIV is breached in the Gaza situation was
made earlier by the ICRC. The ICRC condemned the closure of Gaza in a statement
as a war crime: ‘The whole of Gaza’s civilian population is being punished for acts
for which they bear no responsibility. The closure therefore constitutes a collective
punishment imposed in clear violation of Israel’s obligations under international
humanitarian law’.76 In this statement the ICRC does however not specifically refer
to the naval blockade that was established in 2009, but refers to the closure of Gaza
as a whole that ‘is about to enter its fourth year’. The report then goes on to
conclude that the naval blockade was established in support of the overall closure
regime that must be regarded as disproportionate, and thus also becomes illegally
established. In addition to the view that the blockade is a disproportionate measure,
74 Hudson-Philips report, para. 54 and 60.
75 Hudson-Philips report, para. 33.
76 ICRC news release 10/103, 14-06-2010. ‘Gaza closure: not another year!’ Available at:
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-update-140610.
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it adds that the closure regime, of which the naval blockade is part, constituted
collective punishment for the civilian population:
60. Furthermore, the closure regime is considered by the Mission to constitute
collective punishment of the people living in the Gaza Strip and thus to be
illegal and contrary to article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Apart from judging the naval blockade through the principle of proportionality,
the Mission appears to have also created a new ground to render a blockade
unlawful by referring to article 33 GC IV: when a naval blockade is part of the
breach of article 33 GC IV the blockade must be seen as unlawfully established.
Finally, the Mission concludes that as a consequence of the unlawfulness of the
blockade the military actions against the Mavi Marmara were therefore also
unlawful:
261. The Mission considers that the enforcement of an illegal blockade does
not only constitute a violation of the laws of war, but also a violation of the
laws of neutrality giving rise to State responsibility.
262. Certain results flow from this conclusion. Principally, the action of the
Israel Defense Force in intercepting the Mavi Marmara on the high seas in the
circumstances and for the reasons given was clearly unlawful. Specifically, the
action cannot be justified in the circumstances even under Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
5.2.2 The Turkel-Commission
The Turkel-commission is very detailed on the issue of naval blockade. In its
findings the commission is supported by two ‘special consultants’; Wolff Heintschel
von Heinegg and Michael Schmitt. In paragraphs 56–97 the issue of the naval
blockade and its compliance with the law of blockade is discussed. Clearly the
Commission takes the traditional law requirements as its central point of departure.
It also considers humanitarian aspects to the law of naval blockade, but only as far
as the provisions that are already considered as being a part of the modern law of
blockade and mentioned in the SRM. Although it briefly considers the application of
human rights, it is however reluctant to view the law of blockade from a wholly
humanitarian perspective that reflects the complete scope of humanitarian law.
Contrary to the Hudson-Philips report the Turkel report pays more in-depth
attention to the requirements under traditional blockade law. It discusses first its
compliance with the traditional law of blockade and secondly discusses the modern
humanitarian aspects of the law of blockade. With regard to the traditional law the
overall conclusion is that Israel complied with the requirements of effectiveness,
impartiality and notification.77 The report also gives an interesting insight into what
action Israel has taken to fulfill the requirement of notification.
With regard to the modern (humanitarian) aspects of the law of blockade the
report is guided by sections 102–104 SRM: ‘Once a blockade is established, it is
77 Turkel report, para’s. 57–60.
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likely to have a humanitarian impact on the civilian population in the blockaded
area. The blockading party must therefore consider the humanitarian impact that the
blockade will have on the civilian population of the territory’.78 Also on the
humanitarian aspects the report concludes, similar to the their analysis on the issue
of relief actions,79 that the steps taken by Israel during the naval blockade are
‘consistent with customary international law as provided in articles 102(a) and 103
of the San Remo Manual’.80
Because the Turkel report was published later than the Hudson-Philips report, it
had the opportunity to comment on the views expressed by the Hudson-Philips
Mission, specifically on the view of collective punishment, which is the main
argument in the Hudson-Philips report against their being a lawfully established
blockade. In paragraph 107 the Turkel Commission reaches the following
conclusion with regard to collective punishment and the law of blockade:
107. As for the naval blockade itself, within the framework of the rules that
govern the imposition and enforcement of such a blockade, there is no basis
for an allegation of ‘collective punishment.’ There is nothing in the Red
Cross’ Customary International Law Study that in any way connects the idea
of ‘collective punishment’ with a naval blockade or siege warfare On the
contrary, the Study states that ‘the prohibition of starvation as a method of
warfare does not prohibit the imposition of a naval blockade as long as the
purpose is to achieve a military objective and not to starve a civilian
population.81
The Turkel-Commission, contrary to Hudson-Philips, thereby takes a more
restrictive view of the rendering a blockade unlawful through provisions of
humanitarian law and is apparently of the opinion that the current law of blockade is
limited to the already accepted intertwinements of humanitarian law with the law of
blockade that are mentioned in the SRM. The Commission considered that other
provisions of humanitarian law do not affect the legality of a blockade. A breach of
article 33 GCIV is said to be outside of this scope and cannot therefore lead to the
determination of a naval blockade being unlawful.
5.3 Unlawfulness via a breach of the principles of the law of armed conflict
Doswald-Beck mentions, while discussing the development of international law in
the maritime dimension and the need for a revision of the traditional laws of naval
warfare, that: ‘Furthermore, all aspects of armed conflict should be in conformity
with the basic principles of international humanitarian law, wherever the theatre of
operations might be’ (Doswald-Beck 1995c, p. 585). Although strictly not
necessary, the SRM has incorporated the principle of proportionality into the law
of blockade in section 102b. If the blockade cannot be considered proportional in
78 Turkel report, para. 61.
79 Turkel report, para. 86.
80 Turkel report, para. 77.
81 Turkel report, para. 107.
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relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade,
its establishment is prohibited. The Turkel Commission takes note of the disputed
customary status of this rule by the Israeli Military Advocate General,82 but argues
that even without a specific rule the principle of proportionality remains a principle
that must be taken into account. The arguable difference would be that whether or
not a blockade would become illegal is less explicit, but even if all the requirements
of the (traditional) law are adhered to it still renders the blockade unlawful when the
blockade is excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from the
blockade. In the flotilla incident case both the view that the blockade was
proportionate and disproportionate are taken.
The Hudson-Philips report stated that proportionality is a requirement for a
legally established blockade. In paragraph 53 the Mission mentions that: ‘In
evaluating the evidence submitted to the Mission …[…]… confirming the severe
humanitarian situation in Gaza, the destruction of the economy and the prevention
of reconstruction (as detailed above), the Mission is satisfied that the blockade was
inflicting disproportionate damage upon the civilian population in the Gaza strip and
that as such the interception could not be justified and therefore has to be considered
illegal’. As a conclusion the Mission underlines that:
59. The Mission finds that the policy of blockade or closure regime, including
the naval blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza was inflicting disproportionate
civilian damage. The Mission considers that the naval blockade was
implemented in support of the overall closure regime. As such it was part
of a single disproportionate measure of armed conflict and as such cannot
itself be found proportionate.
With regard to the question of proportionality the Turkel report seeks to
underline several factors that need to be taken into account when assessing
proportionality. As a start the commission underlines the obligation not to cause
excessive damage.83 With regard to military advantage, the commission is
persuaded that if not for the blockade, Hamas could have replenished its weapons
and increased its attacks on Israel by the sea, but notably the attacks have
significantly decreased.84 It furthermore finds it necessary for the proportionality
debate to compare the blockade with the economic sanctions imposed against Iraq
in 1990, to show that the civilian population inherently suffers during economic
sanctions, that although caused debate but was not condemned.85 Finally, it
underlines that Israel has put in place mechanisms on the land borders that intends
to regulate goods entering the Gaza.86 In conclusion:
The Commission has therefore reached the conclusion that Israel is in
compliance with the requirement of proportionality provided in international
82 Turkel report, para. 88.
83 Turkel report, para. 87.
84 Turkel report, para. 89.
85 Turkel report, para’s 92–93.
86 Turkel report, para. 94.
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humanitarian law, especially in view of the extensive steps that it took recently
in order to restrict the effects of the naval blockade and the land crossings
policy on the population of the Gaza Strip.87
5.4 More grounds for unlawfulness of blockades based on humanitarian law?
Until now the naval law discussion on the unlawfulness of a blockade via a breach
of humanitarian law has concentrated on a few provisions of humanitarian law.
Whether or not one accepts the arguments of the Turkel report or the Hudson-
Philips report, the Hudson-Philips report does offer a new approach to the
unlawfulness of blockades based on a provision of humanitarian law. One author
writing on the Gaza conflict has already adopted the view that the Israeli blockade
could result in there being a breach of provisions such as article 33 and 55 GCIV,
but has not added as a conclusion that the blockade is therefore unlawful (Sterio
2010). Although the Hudson-Philips report does not solely base its conclusion on
the breach of article 33 GCIV, it opens the way to the understanding that there may
be other situations where provisions of humanitarian law actually will impact on the
legality of a naval blockade. This however may represent the next step in the
development of the modern law of blockade. Another step further is considering a
blockade unlawful in the situation in which a belligerent willingly chooses not to
address the violation to which the blockade is attributing or addresses it but fails to
take sufficient steps. If no other means are sought to ‘justify’ the blockade, it could
thereby become an unlawful method of war. Such a view appears to be taken in the
recently drafted Manual for Air and Missile warfare (AMW)88 in which the
belligerent is given a choice to allow foodstuff through the aerial blockade or
alternatively to lift the blockade.89 The difficulty will obviously be that it will be
hard to determine whether or not the belligerent has taken sufficient steps.
6 Conclusions
In 1992 Schmitt posed the question: ‘Should the humanitarian principle be the sole
determinant of whether a blockade is legal?’90 Today it may not be the sole
determinant but it cannot be ignored that the humanitarian aspects play a more and
more important part in the question of whether a belligerent naval blockade is
lawful or not. It seems that there is hardly any room for a more restrictive and
legalistic approach based solely on the traditional law of blockade. The conclusion
that must be drawn from the public reactions and the different reports that have been
published so far on the flotilla incident is that the scope of the contemporary laws of
blockade is still not settled. Views on what renders a blockade unlawful rely both on
the more restrictive traditional perspective and modern perspective. Seen through
87 Turkel report, para. 97.
88 This Manual is available at: http://www.ihlresearch.org/amw/.
89 AMW, rule 157, commentary, para. 3.
90 Schmitt (1992), p. 65.
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the eyes of the public spectators who may have only have brief knowledge on how
the laws of blockade are meant to work, the humanitarian perspective on the laws of
war may very well outweigh the traditional approach. A right to humanitarian
assistance during blockade operations may be an already generally accepted
concept, but discussion remains whether the next step—to accept that not fulfilling
provisions of humanitarian law in general may render a blockade unlawful—could
at this stage of the development of the modern law of blockade be a step too far.
There is no disagreement that the unlawfulness of a blockade can arise when there is
a breach of a principle of the laws of war, such as proportionality. The opposing
views on the Israeli military actions against the Mavi Marmara demonstrate
however the difficulty in assessing whether such an action is proportionate or not.
The practice of the Israeli blockade operations represent the first time that the
provisions of SRM on blockade have been put to a practical test in a classical
belligerent blockade. And it is safe to say that they have passed. This has
strengthened the SRM’s position as authoritative guidelines of the law of blockade
and places a new puzzle-piece in the development the laws of naval warfare to
contemporary standards. Many unplaced puzzle pieces with regard to the
development of the law of blockade remain. This article has, for instance, not
delved into many other equally interesting issues with respect to the laws of
blockade that also emerge from the present use of the blockade by Israel, such as the
relationship between the law of blockade and the international law of the sea, and
the freedom of the high seas in particular, or the handling of detainees during
blockade operations.
On 26 December 2010 the Mavi Marmara returned to its Turkish home port91
which closed, for now, an episode that some will remember as a violation of
international law and others as a legal intervention upon a breach of blockade.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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